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Abstract
This paper extends the static analysis of oligopoly structure into an innite-horizon setting with
sunk costs and demand uncertainty. The observation that exit rates decline with rm age motivates the
assumption of last-in rst-out dynamics: An entrant expects to produce no longer than any incumbent.
This selects an essentially unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. With mild restrictions on the demand
shocks, sequences of thresholds describe rms' equilibrium entry and survival decisions. Bresnahan and
Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit assumes that such thresholds govern
the evolution of the number of competitors. Our analysis provides an innite-horizon game-theoretic
foundation for that structure.
JEL Classication: L13.
Keywords: Sunk costs, demand uncertainty, Markov-perfect equilibrium, LIFO.
1 Introduction
This paper develops and presents a simple and tractable model of oligopoly dynamics based on the static
entry game used by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990). A random number of consumers demands the industry's
services, and this state evolves stochastically. Entry possibly requires paying a sunk cost, and continued
operation incurs xed costs. Incumbents who wish to avoid these per-period xed costs in markets that
are no longer protable exit. Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical analysis of oligopolists' entry and exit
assumes that thresholds govern the evolution of the number of competitors. That is, entry occurs whenever
demand passes above one in a sequence of entry thresholds, and exit occurs if it subsequently passes below a
corresponding exit threshold. A monopolist uses a threshold-based rule for entry and exit if raising current
demand stochastically increases tomorrow's demand. We show that this condition alone does not guarantee
that oligopolists use threshold rules, because a larger current market might make future entry more likely
and consequently reduce an oligopolist's value. Nevertheless, we provide mild conditions on the demand
process that guarantee that thresholds govern all rms' equilibrium entry and exit choices. In this way, our
analysis provides an innite-horizon game-theoretic foundation for Bresnahan and Reiss's (1993) empirical
framework, which can be applied to extend their earlier structural estimation of static oligopoly models to
a fully dynamic setting. The model makes a unique equilibrium prediction, which can be calculated very
quickly. Thus, it can be used for policy experiments. This paper's companion (Abbring and Campbell, 2007)
exemplies this with an examination of how raising a barrier to entry for a second rm changes duopoly
dynamics.
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) noted that the static oligopoly entry game can have multiple equilibria,
which obviously complicates prediction. To select a unique equilibrium, both Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)
and Berry (1992) assume that rms move sequentially. We take a similar approach by allowing older rms to
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1commit to continuation before their younger counterparts. We also restrict attention to equilibria in which
rms correctly believe that no rm will produce after an older rival exits. That is, the equilibria have a
last-in rst-out (LIFO) structure. Three considerations motivate this focus. First, it is consistent with the
widespread observation that young rms exit more frequently than their older counterparts. Second, the
equilibrium approximates the \natural" Markov-perfect equilibrium in an extension of the model in which
rms' costs decrease with age and the most ecient rms survive. Third and perhaps most importantly, this
restriction vastly simplies the equilibrium analysis. We prove that, irrespectively of whether the conditions
for threshold rules are imposed or not, there always exists such an equilibrium and that it is (essentially)
unique. This simplicity comes at one substantial cost: All shocks occur at the market level, so there is no
reason for simultaneous entry and exit.
The model's theoretical simplicity makes it well-suited for exploring how parameter changes impact
equilibrium dynamics and long-run market structure. To show this, we calculate the eects of increasing
demand uncertainty on rms' equilibrium entry and exit thresholds. Nonstrategic analysis of the rm life
cycle suggests that additional uncertainty should raise the value of the option to exit and thereby substantially
lower both entry and exit thresholds. The oligopolistic exit thresholds do indeed fall with uncertainty, but
the entry thresholds do not. Their relative invariance re
ects an osetting eect that a monopolist does not
face: Increasing demand uncertainty raises the probability of further entry and thereby reduces a new rm's
value. We also calculate the population \estimates" of oligopoly prot margins using the static ordered
Probit procedure of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and data generated from the model's ergodic distribution.
We nd that the delay in exit arising from uncertainty (familiar from Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) biases
these entry threshold estimates downwards, and this biases the estimated eect of additional competition on
prots downward. That is, a long-run procedure that abstracts from relevant dynamic considerations can
nd \evidence" that prot margins decline with entry when in fact they are constant.
The sequential nature of rms' entry and exit decisions and the assumption that rms rationally expect
LIFO dynamics substantially structures our analysis. In some previous work, the assumption that rms move
sequentially commits early movers to their actions. Examples are Dixit's (1980) two-period Stackelberg
investment game and Maskin and Tirole's (1988) innite-horizon alternating-moves quantity game. In a
nite-horizon game, ordering players' moves usually selects a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Such sequencing need not select a single Markov-perfect equilibrium in an innite-horizon setting like ours,
so researchers sometimes structure expectations with assumptions| such as LIFO| to select a \natural"
equilibrium. For example, Cabral (1993) assumes that younger rms that have not yet exploited the learning
curve and therefore have high costs exit before their older low-cost counterparts. Modifying our model to
make xed costs decline deterministically with a rm's age is straightforward, and we obtain the LIFO
equilibrium as a limit of the sequence of \natural" (in Cabral's sense) equilibria to our model as we send
the learning curve's slope to zero. Thus, the LIFO equilibrium analysis seems useful for industries where
incumbents enjoy small technological advantages over entrants.
Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992) provide analytic results for industry dynamics with many rms,
but we know few similarly useful results for oligopolies. This apparent intractability has led researchers to
approach questions of oligopoly dynamics computationally within Ericson and Pakes's (1995) framework for
the empirical analysis of Markov-perfect oligopoly dynamics. Pakes and McGuire's (1994) algorithm for its
equilibrium calculation iterates on a Bellman-like operator for the rms' value functions. It is well known that
Bellman iteration converges slowly for conventional dynamic programming problems with high-dimensional
states, so it should be no surprise that applying it to the oligopoly problem is computationally expensive.
The proofs of equilibrium existence and uniqueness for our model proceed constructively, beginning with
the survival decision for the youngest rm when no further entry can be protable even at the highest possible
demand realization. Because no incumbents exit during its lifetime, this survival decision corresponds to a
standard dynamic programming problem with only the current demand as a state variable. With this in
hand, we can determine the entry choice for any rm that would occupy this \nal" position. Given these
entry and survival decisions, the survival problem for a rm expecting at most one more entrant corresponds
to a dynamic programming problem with two state variables, current demand and the presence or absence
of a younger competitor. Proceeding recursively in this way yields the unique Markov-perfect equilibrium
decision rules and rm values with a LIFO structure. In this paper's companion (Abbring and Campbell,
2007), we have used this construction to analytically characterize the eects of raising late entrants' sunk costs
and to calculate equilibria for hundreds of parameter values. Because the involved dynamic programming
2problems have a small state space, these calculations together take only a few minutes.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model's primitives and
demonstrates the uniqueness of a Markov-perfect equilibrium with a LIFO structure. To clarify how the
model's moving parts t together, that section closes with an examination of a particular specication for
the demand shocks that yields a pencil-and-paper solution. Section 3 gives sucient conditions for rms
to use threshold rules for their equilibrium entry and exit decisions, and Section 4 illustrates the model's
application with the investigations of the dependence of oligopolists' entry and exit thresholds on demand
uncertainty and of Bresnahan and Reiss's (1990) static estimation procedure.
2 The Model
The model consists of a single oligopolistic market in discrete time t. There is a countably innite number
of rms that are potentially active in the market. We index these rms by j 2 N, and below we refer to j
as the rm's name. At time 0, N0 = 0 rms are active. Entry and subsequent exit determine the number
of active rms in each later period, Nt. The number of consumers in the market, Ct, evolves exogenously
according to a rst-order Markov process bounded between ^ C  0 and  C < 1. We denote the conditional
distribution of Ct with Q(cjCt 1)  Pr[Ct  cjCt 1].
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events and actions within a period using a portion of the game tree.
It begins with the inherited values of Ct 1 and Nt and with the name of the rst potential entrant, Jt.1 All
participants observe the realization of Ct, and all active rms receive prots equal to (Ct=Nt)  (Nt)   .
Here, each rm serves Ct=Nt consumers, and (Nt) is the producer surplus earned from each one.2 Increasing
Nt weakly decreases (Nt). The term  > 0 represents xed costs of production.
After serving the market, active rms decide whether they will remain so. Exit is irreversible but otherwise
costless. It allows the rm to avoid future periods' xed production costs. If rm j is active in this period,
denote the rank of its name in the set of all active rms' names with R
j
t. This equals one for the rm with the
lowest name, and it equals Nt for the rm with the highest name. The active rms' continuation decisions
proceed sequentially in increasing order of this rank. Firms can use mixed strategies, so we describe their
choices with the survival probability a. These strategies' pure realizations also occur sequentially, so a rm
later in the sequence conditions on its rivals' realized (binary) continuation choices.
After active rms' continuation decisions, those rms that have not yet had an opportunity to enter
make entry decisions in the order of their names, starting with Jt. These continue until one potential
entrant remains out of the industry. The rst potential entrant for the next period, Jt+1, has this rm's
name plus one. Because entry decisions proceed sequentially in increasing order of the rms' names, any
entrant j will have a rank R
j
t+1 greater than that of any surviving incumbent. Its cost of entry is '(R
j
t+1).
We assume that '(R
j
t+1)  0 and is weakly increasing in R
j
t+1. This allows for, but does not require, later
entrants to face a \barrier to entry" in the form of elevated sunk costs.3 The payo to staying out of the
industry is always zero, because a rm with an entry opportunity cannot delay its choice. Both active rms'
and potential entrants' decisions maximize their expected stream of prots discounted with a factor  < 1.
Before proceeding, we wish to highlight how the environment gives older rms priority in committing to
continuation. Entry decisions proceed sequentially in increasing order of the rms' names; so active rms'
values of R
j
t rank their ages as well as their names if they entered in distinct periods. In this case, the
ordering of continuation decisions by R
j
t puts the oldest rm rst and the youngest rm last. We employ
the convention of assigning R
j
t based on rms' names to break any ties that occur when two or more rms
enter the market in the same period.
2.1 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
We choose as our equilibrium concept symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium. When rm j decides whether
to stay or exit, Nt   R
j
t (the number of active rms following it in the sequence), Ct, and R
j
t+1 (its rank
1We initialize this with J0 = 0.
2This section's analysis extends directly to a model in which a vector-valued Markov process Ct in
uences total producer
surplus in a general way. In particular, if we replace Ct(Nt) for scalar Ct with (Ct;Nt) for vector-valued Ct, this section's
equilibrium existence and uniqueness results continue to hold without change.
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Figure 1: The game tree within a period.
All rms have names j 2 N. The rank R
j
t orders active rms in increasing order of their names, and Jt
gives the name of the rst rm with an entry opportunity in period t. All rms discount future payos with
 < 1. All rms use mixed strategies (prescribing actions denoted with a 2 [0;1]), and the tree's branches
follow their pure outcomes. See the text for further details.





t+1). Similarly, the payo-relevant state to a potential entrant is Hjt  (Ct;R
j
t+1). Note
that Hjt takes its values in HS  Z+ 
h
^ C;  C
i
 N for rms active in period t and in HE 
h
^ C;  C
i
 N for
potential entrants. Here and below, we use S and E to denote potential survivors and entrants.
A Markov strategy for rm j is a pair of functions A
j
S : HS ! [0;1] and A
j
E : HE ! [0;1]. These
represent the probabilities of being active in the next period given that the rm is currently active (A
j
S) and
given that the rm has an entry opportunity (A
j




E are pure if they are f0;1g-valued.
A symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which all rms follow the same
Markov strategy.
When rms use Markov strategies, the payo-relevant state variables determine an active rm's expected











Here and throughout, we adopt conventional notation and denote the variable corresponding to X in the next
period with X0. In Equation (1), the expectation of N0 is calculated using all rms' strategies conditional
on the particular rm of interest choosing to be active.
It is well known that multiple Markov-perfect equilibria can exist in similar models.4 To overcome this
standard diculty, we restrict attention to equilibria in which rms' entry and exit policies arise from a
last-in rst-out (LIFO) strategy.
Denition 1. A LIFO strategy is a strategy (AS;AE) such that AS is pure, with AS(N  R;C;R0) weakly
decreasing in R.
If all rms adopt a common LIFO strategy (AS;AE), then an active rm with rank R  2 never stays if the
predecessor in the sequence of active rms exits, because
AS(N   R;C;R0) = 0 =) AS(N   R   1;C;R0) = 0:
As a consequence, if rms adopt a common LIFO strategy, they exit in the reverse order of their entry.
Conversely, if rms use a common strategy and always exit in the reverse order of their entry, then the
common strategy is a LIFO strategy.
Empirical studies of industry dynamics consistently nd that young rms exit more frequently than their
older rivals. For example, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) examined the survival of rms that entered
manufacturing between the 1963 and 1967 Economic Censuses and lived to be sampled in 1967. Sixty four
percent of these exited between 1967 and 1972. Their exit rate for the next ve years was still substantial
but considerably lower, 42 percent. This cohort's exit rate for the ve years after that equalled 40 percent.
Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2003) calculated analogous ve-year exit rates for rms that entered retail
trade between 1977 and 1982 and lived until 1982. Of these, 60 percent exited by 1987. Their exit rates
for 1987{1992 and 1992{1997 were 50 percent and 40 percent, so the decline of exit rates occurred more
gradually for that cohort. The restriction to LIFO strategies mimics these declining exit rates in an extreme
way, because the youngest rm always exits rst. We do not doubt that rms sometimes outlast their older
competitors, but the pervasive nding that exit rates decline with an entry cohort's age leads us to believe
that the restriction to LIFO strategies provides a useful point of departure for examining dynamic oligopolies.
The payo from restricting attention to LIFO strategies begins with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy (AS;AE) such
that AS(N  R;C;R0) is pure, constant in N  R, and weakly decreasing in R0; AE(C;R0) is pure and weakly
decreasing in R0; and
AS(N   R;C;R0)  AE(C;R0):
4See Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007).
5The equilibrium survival and entry probabilities in Proposition 1 weakly decrease with the rm's rank in
the next period. Moreover, the survival probability is constant in the number of rms with unresolved
continuation decisions, and weakly larger than the entry probability of a rm with the same prospective
rank in the same demand state.
This paper's appendix contains the proposition's constructive proof, which has two critical steps. First,
we note that the upper bound on C implies that the number of rms that ever produce in a Markov-perfect
equilibrium cannot exceed some bound, which we call  N. Because a rm with rank  N expects none of
its older competitors to cease production before it does, this rm's optimal exit rule corresponds to that
from a simple dynamic programming problem. Second, we solve exit decision problems for rms with ranks
 N   1;  N   2;:::;1 that embody the assumption that other rms follow a LIFO strategy. A rm with
rank R forms its expectations about the behavior of rms with higher ranks using the solutions of those
rms' decision problems. With the solutions to these standard dynamic programming problems in hand, we
construct a candidate LIFO strategy and then verify that it satises the proposition's conditions and forms
a Markov-perfect equilibrium.5
The existence proof strongly suggests that the Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy is unique,
because the decision problems used in its construction have Bellman equations with unique solutions. How-
ever, we might be able to construct multiple LIFO equilibria by varying a rm's actions in states of indif-
ference between activity and inactivity. We sidestep this diculty by concentrating on equilibria in which a
rm defaults to inactivity.
Denition 2. A symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy (AS;AE) defaults to inactivity if AS(HS) =
0 whenever v(HS) = 0 and AE(C;R0) = 0 whenever v(0;C;R0) = '(R0).
Proposition 2. There exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy that defaults
to inactivity. This equilibrium's survival rule AS and entry rule AE are such that AS(N   R;C;R0) is
pure, constant in N   R, and weakly decreasing in R0; AE(C;R0) is pure and weakly decreasing in R0; and
AS(N   R;C;R0)  AE(C;R0).
Note that the proposition's requirement that the equilibrium strategy defaults to inactivity ensures that it
is pure.6
Other symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria that default to inactivity might exist, but in them the appar-
ent advantage of early entrants to commit to continuation does not always translate into longevity. Hence-
forth, we constrain our attention to the unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy
that defaults to inactivity.7
2.2 A Pencil-and-Paper Example
If we assume that Ct = Ct 1 with probability 1    and that it equals a draw from a uniform distribution
on [ ^ C;  C] with the complementary probability, then we can calculate the model's equilibrium value functions
and decision rules with pencil and paper. Before proceeding, we examine this special case to illustrate the
model's moving parts. For further simplication, suppose that (N) = 0 for N  3, so at most two rms
serve the industry. To ensure that the equilibrium dynamics are not trivial, we also assume that no rm
5Amir and Lambson (2003) prove existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in an innite-horizon model that is similar to
ours, but in which rms move simultaneously in each stage game. They do so by constructing an equilibrium that is the limit
of a sequence of LIFO equilibria in the nite-horizon versions of their model as the horizon grows to innity. This suggests
an alternative interpretation of our LIFO equilibrium as the limit of the sequence of equilibria from our model's nite-horizon
analogues.
6Relaxing the assumption that ' is weakly increasing might be of some interest. After removing the conclusion that
AE(C;R0) weakly decreases in R0 from Propositions 1 and 2, both propositions continue to hold good when '(R0) may decrease
with R0.
7In the model, (N) and  depend neither on the rm's name nor on its history. The previous literature on industry dynamics
suggests three ways of relaxing this. The protability of rms could be heterogeneous ex ante, drawn from some distribution
upon entry, or improve with experience in the market. We can extend the model in these directions if the modications
never make a younger rm more protable than any older rival. For example, we can incorporate irreproducible rm-specic
capabilities by assigning higher xed costs to rms with higher names. Drawing, upon entry, a rm's xed cost from a two-
point distribution with a very large higher value would also leave the model's LIFO structure intact. Such shocks can create
simultaneous entry and exit as potential entrants sequentially try to draw a low xed cost. The learning curve mentioned in
this paper's introduction exemplies rm-specic changes in prots after entry.
6will serve the industry if demand is low enough and that two rms will serve the industry if it is suciently
high.8
To begin, consider an incumbent rm with rank 2. In an equilibrium in a LIFO strategy, its prot equals
(C=2)(2)   . It will earn this until the next time that Ct changes, at which point the new demand value
will be statistically independent of its current value. It is straightforward to use these facts to show that
this rm's value function is the following piecewise linear function of C:
v(0;C;2) =
(
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dC0:
Here, e v(0;2) is the rm's expected value following a new draw of Ct and C2 is the largest value of C that
satises v(0;C;2) = 0. Optimality requires the rm to exit if C < C2. This value function is monotonic in
C, so there is a unique entry threshold C2 that equates the continuation value with the entry cost. Thus, a
second duopolist enters whenever Ct exceeds C2 and exits if it subsequently falls at or below C2.
Next, consider the problem of an incumbent with rank 1. If this rm is currently a monopolist, it expects
to remain so until Ct > C2; and if it is currently a duopolist, it expects to become a monopolist when Ct
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1 (1 ) if C > C2:
The exit threshold C1 is the greatest value of C such that v(0;C;1) = 0, and the expected values following
a change in Ct for a monopolist and a duopolist are
e v(0;1) =
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dC0:
The value function of a rm with rank 1 does not always increase with C, because slightly raising C from
C2 induces entry by the second rm and causes both current prots and the continuation value to discretely
drop. Nevertheless we know that they drop to a value above '(1), because at this point the second rm
chooses to enter. Hence, it is still possible to nd a unique entry threshold C1 that equates the value of
entering with rank 1 to the cost of doing so.
8Sucient conditions for these two properties are
(1   )
h
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the pencil-and-paper example.
In this example, Ct+1 = Ct with probability 1  and equals a draw from a uniform distribution over [ ^ C;  C]
with the complementary probability. A rm with the opportunity to become the second entrant takes it if
C > C2, and that rm subsequently exits if C  C2. The value of the rst rm to enter is discontinuous.
As a function of Ct, the value of such a rm starting the period without a competitor begins at the origin,
proceeds horizontally to C1, and then follows the monopoly branch until C2. It then discontinuously drops
to the duopoly branch and follows it until C reaches  C. The rst entrant's value when facing an active
competitor follows the same path except that the discontinuous fall occurs at C2 instead of C2. The grey
arrows indicate the fall in the rm's value upon entry of a second rm and the increase in value when that
competitor exits. Please see the text for further details.
8Figure 2 visually represents the equilibrium. In each panel, C runs along the horizontal axis. The vertical
axis gives the value of a rm when entry and exit decisions are made. The top panel plots the value of a
rm with rank 1, while the bottom panel plots the value for a competitor with rank 2. The value of a
duopolist with rank 2 equals zero for C < C2, and thereafter increases linearly with C. The entry threshold
C2 equates this value with '(2). The value of a rm with rank 1 has two branches. The monopoly branch
gives the value of a monopolist when C  C2. If C increases above C2 and thus induces entry, the rm's
value drops to the duopoly branch. This has the same slope as the value function in the lower panel. Its
intercept is higher, because the incumbent expects to eventually become a monopolist the rst time that C
passes below C2. When this occurs, the rm's value returns to the monopoly branch. The entry and exit
thresholds for this rm occur where the monopoly branch intersects '(1) and 0.
The paper-and-pencil example provides a useful basic framework for analytically characterizing the eects
of policy interventions in a dynamic duopoly. This paper's companion (Abbring and Campbell, 2007) uses
this to determine the eects of raising a barrier to entry in a monopoly by increasing a second entrant's sunk
costs, and to explore the consequences of replacing the LIFO assumption with a rst-in rst-out (FIFO)
assumption.
3 Threshold Entry and Exit Rules
In the paper-and-pencil example, all rms follow threshold rules for their entry and continuation decisions.
Denition 3. A rm with rank R0 follows a threshold rule if there exist real numbers CR0 and CR0 such
that
AS(N   R;C;R0) = IfC > CR0g and AE(C;R0) = IfC > CR0g:
With such a rule, a potential entrant into a market with R0   1 incumbents actually enters if and only if
C > CR0, and this rm exits the rst time thereafter that C  CR0.
There are three reasons to care about whether or not rms follow threshold rules. First, they pervade
theoretical and empirical industrial organization. Second, they simplify the model's analysis, as the pencil-
and-paper example illustrated. Third, as the next proposition shows, higher realizations of demand always
result in more active rms in our model if and only if all rms use threshold rules. A monotonic in
uence of
Ct on Nt+i, i > 0, appeals to us as \natural".9
Proposition 3. Consider an initial condition (Nt;Ct); a sequence of subsequent demand realizations
Ct+1;:::;Ct+i 1; and the corresponding numbers of operating rms from the equilibrium of Proposition 2;
Nt+1;:::;Nt+i. Increasing Ct weakly increases Nt+i for positive i and any possible initial condition and
sequence of subsequent demand realizations if and only if rms of all ranks follow threshold rules.
Appendix B presents the proposition's proof.
With stochastic monotonicity| Q(jC) weakly decreases with C| the value function for the rm with
the highest possible rank weakly increases with C. Therefore, such a rm must follow a threshold rule.10
Hopenhayn (1992) uses this to demonstrate the existence of an optimal exit threshold for competitive rms.
The Poisson innovation process from the pencil-and-paper example displays stochastic monotonicity, but
the lower ranked rm's value function falls when a second competitor enters. Although that rm's value
function is not monotonic, thresholds still govern its entry and exit. Thus, one might hope that the rms in
our model use threshold rules when C displays stochastic monotonicity. We show that this is not the case
with the following numerical example.
Let us set  N = 2 and place lnCt 2 [ 1:50;1:50]. Suppose that the probability of lnCt remaining
unchanged is 1=2. With probability 1=4 it falls to the maximum of lnCt  0:30 and ln ^ C, and with the same
9A threshold rule is only well-dened if Ct is a scalar, so this section's analysis does not apply to the generalization to
vector-valued Ct mentioned in Footnote 2.
10Later in this section, we will make an additional left-continuity assumption, Assumption 4, that ensures that this rule has
Denition 3's strict threshold-crossing representation if it defaults to inactivity.





0 if lnc < maxflnC   0:30; 1:50g;
1=4 if maxflnC   0:30; 1:50g  lnc < lnC;
3=4 if lnC  lnc < minflnC + 0:30;1:50g; and
1 otherwise.
The model's other parameters in this example are '(1) = '(2) = 10, (N) = 2  IfN  2g,  = 1, and
 = 1:05 1. Figure 3 shows both rms value functions.11 Clearly, the equilibrium entry rule for a rm with
prospective rank 1 does not obey a threshold rule. Such a rm will enter in the disconnected sets A and B,
where the rm's value exceeds the cost of entry.
This example fails to produce threshold rules because a continuous increase in C leads to a discontinuous
jump in the probability of future entry: Crossing the upper boundary of A raises the probability of entry
next period from 0 to 1=4. The rst entrant's value drops discretely, because the continuous increase in
current protability does not oset the loss from this increase in expected competition. In contrast, the
probability of future entry was constant by design in the paper-and-pencil example.
Comparing the two examples suggests that rms will use threshold rules if the stochastic process limits
this negative eect of increasing Ct on expected future prots. Here, we present sucient conditions on
Q(jC) for this to be so.
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity). E[C0jC] is weakly increasing in C.
Assumption 2 (Independence). The innovation error U0  C0   E[C0jC] is independent of C.
Assumption 3 (Concavity). The cumulative distribution function ~ Q of U0 is concave on [U;1), where
U  infC fC   E[C0jC]g.
Assumption 4 (Continuity). E[C0jC] is continuous from the left.
Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply stochastic monotonicity. In particular, Assumption 2 is equivalent
to Q(cjC) = ~ Q(c   E[C0jC]) for all c. With Assumption 1, this ensures that Q(jC) weakly decreases with
C.
Assumptions 2 and 3 together require Q(jC) to be concave on [C;1), because c   E[C0jC]  C  
E[C0jC]  U if c  C. Equivalently, Q(jC) must have a weakly decreasing Lebesgue density to the right
of C. The three-point distribution used to create Figure 3 satises Assumptions 1 and 2, but violates
Assumption 3.
Assumption 4 implies that the value function in the equilibrium that defaults to inactivity is continuous
from the left in C. It carries little substance, because Assumption 1 already implies that E[C0jC] has at
most countably many discontinuities.
With these assumptions in place, we can state this section's central result.
Proposition 4. Let (AS;AE) be the unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy that
defaults to inactivity. If Q(jC) satises Assumptions 1{4, then rms with all ranks follow threshold policies.
The proposition's proof is given in Appendix B. Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that the conditional distribution
of C0 has no mass points or modes to the right of C. Thus, increasing C cannot move a \substantial"
probability mass over another rm's entry threshold and cause a \discontinuous" increase in the probability
of future entry (as in our example of a nonmonotonic exit rule). Together with Assumption 1, this suces
to guarantee that, for each given rank, the equilibrium value function crosses the cost of entry only once
and is weakly increasing to the left of that crossing. The corresponding equilibrium strategy prescribes that
rms enter and survive if demand exceeds rank-dependent entry and exit thresholds. Assumption 4 only
ensures that the equilibrium strategy that defaults to inactivity has Denition 3's strict threshold-crossing
representation.
To shed further light on the content of Assumption 3, suppose that U0 has a uniform distribution with
support [ =2;=2]. Assumption 3 requires E[C0jC]   =2  C for all C. That is, the minimum possible
realization of C0   C cannot exceed zero. In this sense, Assumption 3 bounds the growth of demand.
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Figure 3: Example of LIFO equilibrium with a nonmonotonic entry rule.
In this example, lnCt+1   lnCt equals zero with probability 1=2 and equals either minf0:30;ln  C=Ctg or
maxf 0:30;lnCt= ^ Cg with probability 1=4 placed on each value. A rm with the opportunity to become the
second entrant takes it if lnCt > 0:13. The value of entry for a rst entrant exceeds its cost if lnCt is slightly
less than 0:13   0:30 =  0:17. Increasing lnCt from such a value pushes the highest possible realization of
lnCt+1 past 0:13. This discontinuously lowers the rst entrant's value to a point below the cost of entry.
Hence, the equilibrium entry strategy is not monotonic in Ct. Please see the text for further details.
11The Poisson innovation process from the pencil-and-paper example also satises the assumptions of
Proposition 4. The following representation theorem demonstrates that these two examples are \typical" of
such processes and aids in the construction of others.
Proposition 5. The transition function Q(jC) satises Assumptions 1{3 if and only if there exist a sequence
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k (C) weakly increases in C,
{ ^ C + K
k =2  K
k (C)   C   K
k =2, and
{ K
k (C)  C + K
k =2.
This proposition's proof, in Appendix B, relies on the well-known fact that concave distributions can be
represented by mixtures of uniform distributions with common lower ends of their supports.
Proposition 5 implies that each demand process that satises Assumptions 1{3 can be constructed by
mixing uniform autoregressions that each satisfy monotonicity (as in Assumption 1) and the support condi-
tion used in the example. In particular, each of the mixed processes is a possibly nonlinear autoregression
with conditional mean K





k give the mixing probabilities. The stochastic process from the pencil-and-paper example is such a mix-
ture, with  and 1    serving as the mixing probabilities. In this case, one of the uniform distributions is
degenerate at C. The support condition that K
k (C)  C + K
k =2 ensures that the current state is always
in or above the support of each mixing distribution. With uniformity, this guarantees that Q(jC) has a
nonincreasing Lebesgue density on (C;  C] (Assumption 3).
To construct another example process, consider a random walk re






^ C + K
k =2 if C  ^ C + K
k =2;
C if ^ C + K
k =2 < C   C   K
k =2; and
 C   K
k =2 if C >  C   K
k =2;
for some 0 < K
k <  C   ^ C. By mixing over such re
ected random walks, we can approximate any symmetric
and continuous distribution for the growth rate of demand in the region away from the boundaries of [ ^ C;  C].






k (C) is continuous from the left. In both the pencil-and-paper and the re
ected
random walk examples, this limit is continuous, and Assumption 4 is satised.
124 Entry and Exit with Uncertainty
This section applies our analysis to two related questions: How does adding uncertainty impact oligopolists'
entry and exit thresholds? How do estimates of oligopolists' producer surplus per consumer based on static
models of the \long-run" without uncertainty or without sunk costs dier from their actual values?
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) review a large literature that characterizes competitive rms' entry and exit
decisions with sunk costs and uncertain prots. Such a rm's value equals its fundamental value, the expected
discounted prots from perpetual operation, plus the value of an option to sell this stream of (potentially
negative) prots at a strike price of zero. This literature's key insight is that uncertainty about future prots
raises the value of this put option and thereby decreases the frequency of exit. Abbring and Campbell
(2006) estimated that this option value accounted for the majority of rm value in a particular competitive
service industry. Our model allows us to investigate how the insights from this well-studied decision-theoretic
problem apply to oligopolistic dynamics.
Our analysis of the second question follows a large literature based on static free-entry models of oligopoly
structure, exemplied by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991b) and Berry (1992). They determined empirically
how changing market size in
uenced the number of competitors using observations from cross-sections of
local retail (Bresnahan and Reiss) and airline (Berry) markets. The models they used to structure their
analysis can be viewed as versions of ours in which either demand remains unchanged over time or rms
incur no sunk costs. These papers point to current demand as the key determinant of the number of rms:
A market will attain N rms if N entrants can recover their xed costs, but N + 1 entrants cannot. These
authors emphasize that the observed relationship between C and N depends on the rate at which (N)
decreases (which Sutton, 1991, labeled the toughness of competition) and the rate at which '(N) increases
(which McAfee, Mialon, and Williams, 2004, dene to be an economic barrier to entry). If both of these
functions are constant, then the number of active rms is roughly proportional to demand, Ci = i  C1:
However, if either (N) decreases or '(N) increases, then N=C declines with C. In this sense, increasing
the toughness of competition or imposing an economic barrier to entry increases concentration.
Our approach to answering these questions is computational. Accordingly, we begin this section with an
explicit presentation of the algorithm for equilibrium calculation. We then show how demand uncertainty
impacts equilibrium entry and exit thresholds for a particular model parameterization. The section concludes
with a presentation of the entry thresholds and the producer surplus per consumer calculated from feeding
data generated by our model's ergodic distribution through a static Probit model of long-run equilibrium
like that of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991b).
4.1 Equilibrium Computation
The proof of Proposition 1 outlines a simple algorithm for computing the Markov-perfect equilibrium of
interest:
{ Given values for the model's primitives, we choose an evenly spaced grid of values for C in the interval
[ ^ C;  C] and a Markov chain over this grid to approximate Q(jC).
{ We set  N equal to the largest value of N such that
 C
N
(N)     0:
{ We consider the decision problem of a rm with rank  N. This rm rationally expects no further entry
and sets N0 equal to N0
 N(X;C)   N in all states (X;C). Here, X is the number of active rms
with unresolved continuation decisions: X = 0 for a potential entrant and X = N   R for an active
rm deciding on continuation. Under this supposition, we can solve the rm's dynamic programming
problem by beginning with a trial value for its value function v(0;;  N) and iterating on the Bellman
operator in Equation (1) for N = R = R0 =  N. This gives the rm's expected discounted prots
v(0;C;  N) for all C on the chosen grid. In practice, this takes very, very little computer time. From
v(0;;  N), we can calculate the sets of demand states C in which the rm chooses to enter and survive.
We refer to these as the entry and survival sets
E  N  fCjv(0;C;  N) > '(  N)g and S  N  fCjv(0;C;  N) > 0g:
13{ The rest of the computation proceeds recursively for R0 =  N 1;:::;1. Suppose that we have computed
entry sets ER0+1;:::;E  N and survival sets SR0+1;:::;S  N. A rm with (prospective) rank R0 rationally
expects that these sets govern younger rms' entry and survival decisions, and that no rm will enter
with rank larger than  N. That is,
N0






I fi  X;C 2 SR0+ig + I fi > X;C 2 ER0+ig
i
governs the evolution of the number of rms; X = 0;1;:::;  N   R0. With this specication for N0 in
place, we can solve this rm's dynamic programming problem by iterating on the Bellman operator
in Equation (1) for given R0, starting with e.g. the value function for a rm with rank R0 + 1. This
produces the expected discounted prots v(X;;R0), and the entry and survival sets
ER0  fCjv(0;C;R0) > '(R0)g and SR0  fCjv(0;C;R0) > 0g;
for a rm with rank R0.
With the equilibrium entry and survival sets for all  N possible ranks in place, calculating observable
aspects of industry dynamics (such as the ergodic distribution of Nt) is straightforward. Matlab programs
and documentation are available in this article's replication le.
4.2 Equilibrium Entry and Exit Thresholds
With this algorithm, we have calculated the equilibrium entry and exit thresholds for a particular specication
of the model that satises the sucient conditions for rms to use threshold-based entry and exit policies.
We set one model period to equal one year and chose  to replicate a 5% annual rate of interest. We set
 = 1:75 and '(R0) = 0:25=(1 ), so the xed costs of a continuing establishment equal seven times sunk
costs' rental equivalent value. We also set (N) = 4 for all N. With these parameter values and no demand
uncertainty, the entry thresholds are 8=7 of the corresponding exit thresholds and the entry threshold for a
second rm equals one. We set ^ C = e 1:5,  C = e1:5, and Q(jC) to equal a mixture over 51 re
ected random
walks in the logarithm of C with uniformly distributed innovations. The mixture approximates a normally
distributed innovation. We denote the standard deviation of the normal distribution we seek to approximate
with . Proposition 4 can be easily extended to the case where Assumptions 1{4 apply to a monotonic
transformation of Ct, so the logarithmic specication for demand has no direct theoretical consequences. We
choose it because population and income measures typically require a logarithmic transformation to display
homoskedasticity across time.
The rst two panels of Table 1 report the equilibrium entry and exit thresholds for this specication
for four values of : 0, 0:05, 0:10, and 0:15. Given the support of Ct, up to eight rms could populate
the industry if  = 0. Because Ct is re
ected o of  C, demand displays mean reversion. Thus, such high
states of demand are somewhat temporary if  > 0, and the maximum number of rms observed in the
ergodic distribution accordingly decreases with . The two panels' cells for those missing rms' entry and
exit thresholds are blank.12
Consider rst the impact of increasing  on the entry thresholds. At least one rm enters an empty
market with no demand uncertainty if Ct > 0:50. This threshold hardly changes as  increases. Likewise,
the entry threshold for a second rm remains very close to 1:00 as  rises. The thresholds for higher-ranked
entrants all rise with  with one exception (to be discussed further below). Apparently, increasing demand
uncertainty makes entry into an oligopoly less likely for a given value of Ct. Demand uncertainty has exactly
the opposite impact on the entry of a potential monopolist. For such a rm, increasing uncertainty increases
the value of the put option associated with exit, thereby raising protability and lowering the rm's entry
threshold.
12One way of gauging how much uncertainty these experiments embody is to calculate their entry and exit rates. When
 = 0, the probability of a rm randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution exiting equals zero. This probability equals 0:5
percent, 1:1 percent, and 1:7 percent for the other three values of . These are annual exit rates, because we set  so that one
period equals one year.
14This dierence between oligopolists' and monopolists' entry decisions arises from the threat of potential
entry. A monopolist captures all of the increased prot from a favorable demand shock. For an oligopolist,
further entry chops this right tail o of the prot distribution and thereby reduces the rm's option value.
This explanation squares with the single exception to the rule that increasing  increases the entry threshold.
Increasing  from 0:10 to 0:15 simultaneously eliminates the possibility that a sixth rm enters and reduces
C5 from 2:70 to 2:59.13 The third panel of Table 1 further illustrates this eect. It reports the equilibrium
entry thresholds for the case where (N) = 4IfN < 5g, so that no more than four rms will populate the
market. The entry thresholds for the rst, second, and third rms are nearly identical to their values in the
rst panel. However, the entry thresholds for the fourth rm (facing no further entry) decline with .
Next examine the exit thresholds in the table's second panel. Without demand uncertainty, these form
a line out of the origin with a slope approximately equal to 0:44. As expected, raising  decreases all
of the exit thresholds. This mimics the well-known eect of increased uncertainty on monopolists' exit
decisions: Uncertainty raises the value of the rm's put option, and exit requires this option's exercise. For
completeness, Table 1 reports the equilibrium exit thresholds when (N) = 4  IfN < 5g. As expected,
this change has almost no impact on the exit thresholds for rms with ranks less than four. For the fourth
rm, eliminating the possibility of further entry makes survival more attractive and thereby lowers the exit
threshold even further.
To summarize, adding uncertainty either leaves the equilibrium entry thresholds unchanged or raises
them somewhat. This result embodies two osetting eects: Increasing uncertainty alone would make entry
more attractive, but the accompanying increase in the probability of future entry reduces expected future
prots. Changing the probability of future entry has comparatively little impact on the equilibrium exit
thresholds, so adding uncertainty substantially reduces them.
4.3 Static Analysis of Market Size and Entry
We now characterize how a static \long-run" analysis of market size and entry interprets data generated
by our dynamic model. For this, we modify our model to obtain a framework observationally equivalent
to that estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991b). We begin by eliminating all but trivial dynamic
considerations with the assumption that Ct = Ct 1 always. All markets begin with zero competitors, so
removing demand uncertainty from the model eliminates exit. It also removes any meaningful distinction
between xed and sunk costs, so we set the latter to zero. This version of the model is econometrically
degenerate because Ct 1 determines Nt nonstochastically. We follow Bresnahan and Reiss and solve this
problem by adding a random component to rms' xed costs. Specically, the xed costs of any rm serving
the market are e", where " is a normally distributed across markets with mean 0 and variance &2.
Free entry requires that all active rms earn a positive prot and that an additional rm would earn a
nonpositive prot.14 That is
C
N
 (N) > e" and
C
N + 1
 (N + 1)  e":
For each N = 1;:::;  N; dene the deterministic entry threshold C?
N to be the unique solution to (C=N)(N) 
 = 0. Exactly N rms will serve the industry if lnC > lnC?
N + " and lnC  lnC?
N+1 + ". The probability














In this expression, we set lnC?
0 =  1 and lnC?
 N+1 = 1.15
13Entry by an eighth rm does not occur when there is demand uncertainty, so this discussion begs the question of why
increasing  from 0 to 0:05 raises C7 from 3:49 to 3:61. This change re
ects the mean reversion noted above. The same
principle explains the rise of C6 from 3:13 to 3:21 when  goes from 0:05 to 0:10.
14The free entry conditions equal those from a model without dynamic considerations, because we have set sunk costs to
zero. If we had assumed instead that the per period xed costs equal zero and that the sunk costs equal e"', then the free
entry conditions would be identical with '(1   )= replacing  everywhere.
15Note that more than  N rms will enter in the static model if 
   N + 1

> 0 and the realization of " is suciently small.
However, we will apply the static model to data generated from the dynamic model, which never have more than  N active
rms. For the purpose of this application, we can therefore ignore the possibility entry beyond  N rms.
15Table 1: Equilibrium Entry and Exit Thresholdsa
(N) = 4
Entry Thresholds
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 1.99 2.50 2.99 3.49 3.99
0.05 0.48 0.99 1.51 2.04 2.57 3.13 3.61
0.10 0.46 1.00 1.56 2.14 2.70 3.21
0.15 0.46 1.02 1.62 2.19 2.59
Exit Thresholds
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
0.00 0.44 0.87 1.31 1.74 2.18 2.62 3.05 3.49
0.05 0.38 0.76 1.15 1.54 1.93 2.32 2.70
0.10 0.33 0.69 1.05 1.41 1.77 2.12
0.15 0.28 0.64 0.97 1.30 1.60
(N) = 4  I fN  4g
Entry Thresholds
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 1.99
0.05 0.48 0.98 1.52 1.91
0.10 0.46 1.00 1.57 1.78
0.15 0.46 1.04 1.56 1.77
Exit Thresholds
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
0.00 0.44 0.87 1.31 1.74
0.05 0.38 0.76 1.16 1.51
0.10 0.33 0.69 1.05 1.31
0.15 0.28 0.64 0.96 1.19
aNotes: The parameter values used were  = 1:75,  = 1:05 1, '(R0) = 0:25=(1 ),
^ C = e 1:5,  C = e1:5, and Q(jC) a mixture over re
ected random walks in the logarithm
of C with uniformly distributed innovations and approximate innovation variance 2.
An empty cell indicates that the ergodic distribution of Nt puts zero probability on the
given value of N. Please see the text for further details.
16Table 2: Static Probit Analysis of Market Structurea










0.00 0.44 0.93 1.37 1.86 2.37 2.95 3.41 3.90
0.05 0.43 0.87 1.32 1.78 2.24 2.70 3.13
0.10 0.39 0.83 1.29 1.75 2.20 2.62
0.15 0.34 0.81 1.26 1.70 2.05
Implied (N)=(1) for N =
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.00 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.91
0.05 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95
0.10 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.90
0.15 1.00 0.85 0.82 0.81 0.83
aNotes: The table's top panel reports population values of Probit-based entry thresholds
from the static model of Bresnahan and Reiss calculated using the ergodic distribution
of the dynamic model specication of Section 4.2 and Table 1. The bottom panel reports
the implied values of (N) normalized by (1). An empty cell indicates that the ergodic
distribution of Nt puts zero probability on the given value of N. Please see the text for
further details.
Given observations of C and N from a cross section of markets, ordered Probit estimation immediately
yields estimates of C?
1;:::;C?
 N; and &. With these, Bresnahan and Reiss estimate how the producer surplus
per consumer falls with additional competitors. Specically, the denition of C?
N implies that (N)=(1) =
C?
1  N=C?
N. If the level of demand required to support N rms equals N times the level required for a
monopolist, then the producer surplus per consumer does not fall with additional entry. On the other hand,
if demand must exceed N  C?
1 to induce N rms to enter, then the surplus per consumer must decline
with N. In this way, Bresnahan and Reiss infer the toughness of competition from the relationship between
market size and the number of competitors.
For any given joint distribution of C and N, we can dene the population counterparts to the estimated






















Because the ordered Probit likelihood function is always concave, even if it does not represent the true
data generating process, this function is minimized at a unique set of static entry thresholds C?
1;:::;C?
 N.
Calculating these static entry thresholds using the joint distribution of Ct and Nt from the fully dynamic
model's ergodic distribution, mimicking Bresnahan and Reiss by using these to \estimate" (N)=(1), and
comparing these \estimates" to the true values of (N)=(1) from the dynamic model indicates whether
static estimates of the toughness of competition suer from substantial bias.
The top panel of Table 2 reports population values of the Probit-based static entry thresholds C?
1;:::;C?
 N
calculated using the ergodic distribution of the dynamic model specication examined in Section 4.2. Its
bottom panel gives the implied \estimates" of (N)=(1). For all three of values of  used, the static entry
thresholds almost exactly equal the average of the dynamic model's corresponding entry and exit thresholds.
That is, the static analysis \splits the dierence" between them.
Recall that the true values of (N)=(1) all equal one. That is, an additional competitor steals business
from incumbents but does not lower the producer surplus earned per consumer. For the case with  =
0:05, the implied values deviate little from the truth. However, raising  further substantially lowers these
\estimates". When  = 0:15, the implied value of (2)=(1) equals 0:85. Further increases in N change this
little.
17Apparently, the static Probit analysis can nd evidence that (N) falls with data generated from a
dynamic model in which (N) is constant. To gain some insight into how sunk costs and uncertainty aect
the static analysis of the toughness of competition, recall that the static Probit's thresholds are roughly
the average of the dynamic entry and exit thresholds. Hence, without uncertainty both the static and the
dynamic thresholds are evenly spaced if (N) is constant. For example, from the static analysis we may nd
that it takes 1000 consumers for one rm and 2000 consumers for two rms to be active in the market. With
uncertainty, however, option value considerations will make rms of all ranks more reluctant to exit. Because
this eect is not oset by a change in the entry thresholds (see the previous section and Table 1), the static
thresholds will decrease as well. We may now \observe" that it takes only 500 consumers for one rm and
1500 consumers for two rms to be active. The fact that the number of consumers needs to triple to entice
a second rm to join the rst suggests that the producer surplus per consumer served falls substantially
when a second rm enters. However, this inference arises from uncertainty; the actual producer surplus per
consumer served is constant.16
In our analysis, the delay in exit arising from option-value considerations imparts a substantial downward
bias to each estimated threshold. This bias is large in the specication under consideration. Determining
its importance for empirical work must proceed on a case-by-case basis, but we expect option-value consid-
erations to pervade oligopolists' exit decisions. A comparison of the results of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b)
with the \estimates" in Table 2 supports this view. Their abstract reports:
Our empirical results suggest that competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of incum-
bents increases. In markets with ve or fewer incumbents, almost all variation in competitive
conduct occurs with the entry of the second or third rm.
This is exactly the pattern displayed in Table 2.
A Proofs of Results in Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds by rst constructing a candidate equilibrium strategy and then
verifying that it is a LIFO strategy that forms an equilibrium and satises the proposition's requirements.
Preliminaries Dene  N as in Section 4.1. Because  C is nite, (N) is weakly decreasing in N, and  > 0;
 N < 1. This is an upper bound on the number of rms that would ever produce in a LIFO equilibrium.
Next, consider the exit decision problem of a rm with (prospective) rank R0   N that expects the number
of rms to evolve according to the deterministic transition rule N0
R0 : Z+  [ ^ C;  C] ! fR0;R0 + 1;:::;  Ng.
Here, N0
R0(X;C) is the number of rms that the rm with rank R0 expects to be active next period given a
decision to continue, that X younger rms are active this period, and that the number of consumers equals
C. The number of active rms next period is dened for the event that R0 + X >  N, but it never exceeds
 N. Dene W to be the space of all functions
w : f0;:::;  N   1g 
h





















Note that TR0 depends on the specication for N0
R0. It satises Blackwell's sucient conditions for a con-
traction mapping, and W is a complete metric space. Hence, TR0 has a unique xed point, the value function
wR0.
16Another logical possibility is that the fall in the implied static thresholds re
ects mean reversion: Because C cannot fall
below ^ C, a potential entrant does not expect extremely low values of C to persist. We examined whether this contributes to
our results by changing ^ C and  C from e 1:5 and e1:5 to e 2 and e2. The results dier only minimally from those in Table 2.
18Construction of a candidate equilibrium Begin with the decision problem for a rm with rank  N
and the transition rule N0
 N(X;C) =  N for all (X;C). This transition rule re
ects the rm's expectations
that it produces no longer than any earlier entrant, any younger active rms will exit, and no rms will
enter. The xed point w  N of T  N can be uniquely extended to a value function on the entire state space
Z+  [ ^ C;  C] by assigning w  N(X;C) = w  N(0;C) for all (X;C). Denote fCjw  N(0;C) > 0g with S  N and
fCjw  N(0;C) > '(  N)g with E  N. Note that S  N  E  N.Under the maintained hypotheses of this maximization
problem, this rm chooses to remain active if and only if C 2 S  N and it chooses to enter the industry if and
only if C 2 E  N.17
Next, iterate the following argument for R0 =  N   1;:::;1.
(i). Suppose that we have in hand value functions wR0+1;:::;w  N; entry sets ER0+1;:::;E  N; and survival
sets SR0+1;:::;S  N; and that
{ ER0+1    E  N,
{ SR0+1    S  N,
{ S ~ R  E ~ R for all ~ R  R0 + 1, and
{ w ~ R(X;C) = w ~ R(  N   ~ R;C) if X >  N   ~ R for all ~ R  R0 + 1.
(ii). Consider the decision problem for a rm with rank R0 and transition rule
N0




I fi  X;C 2 SR0+ig + I fi > X;C 2 ER0+ig
i
; (3)
where E ~ R = S ~ R = ; for ~ R >  N. This transition rule re
ects the rm's expectations that it produces
no longer than any earlier entrant and that ER0+i and SR0+i, i 2 N, govern younger rms' entry
and survival. The specication for N0
R0 implies that N0
R0(X;C) = N0
R0(  N   R0;C) if X >  N   R0.
Therefore, we can uniquely extend the xed point wR0 of TR0 to a value function on the entire state
space Z+ 
h
^ C;  C
i
by assigning wR0(X;C) = wR0(  N   R0;C) for all X >  N   R0.
(iii). Denote the complete subspace of functions w such that
{ w(X + 1;C)  wR0+1(X;C), X = 0;:::;  N   2, and
{ w(X;C) is weakly decreasing in X, for all C;
with WR0  W. We wish to show that TR0 maps WR0 into itself. Because S ~ R  E ~ R for all ~ R  R0 + 1
by supposition, Equation (3) implies that N0
R0+1(X;C)  N0











and for w 2 WR0,
w(N0
R0(X + 1;C)   R0;C0)  w(N0
R0+1(X;C)   (R0 + 1) + 1;C0)
 wR0+1(N0
R0+1(X;C)   (R0 + 1);C0):
(iv). For w 2 WR0, applying these inequalities to the Bellman operator bounds TR0(w)(X+1;C) from below
by wR0+1(X;C) because









   + w(N0










   + wR0+1(N0
R0+1(X;C)   (R0 + 1);C0)

= wR0+1(X;C):
The transition rule N0
R0(X;C) weakly increases in X, so that TR0(w)(X;C) weakly decreases in X if
w 2 WR0. Therefore, w 2 WR0 =) TR0(w) 2 WR0. Since TR0 is a contraction mapping and WR0 is
complete, TR0 has a unique xed point wR0 2 WR0. These properties extend to the entire state space
Z+ 
h
^ C;  C
i
; because, for X   N   R0,
{ wR0(X + 1;C) = wR0(  N   R0;C)  wR0+1(  N   R0   1;C) = wR0+1(X;C) and
{ wR0(X;C) = wR0(  N   R0;C).
(v). Finish this step of the recursion by noting that wR0(0;C)  wR0(1;C)  wR0+1(0;C) for all C, so
ER0  fCjwR0(0;C) > '(R0)g  ER0+1, SR0  fCjwR0(0;C) > 0g  SR0+1, and SR0  ER0.
With the recursion complete, specify the candidate equilibrium strategy as
AS(X;C;R0) =





1 if C 2 ER0 and,
0 otherwise.
Verication Since AS(X;C;R0) is constant in X, the candidate is a LIFO strategy. The candidate is
pure, and it weakly decreases in R0 since SR0  SR0+1 and ER0  ER0+1. Finally, AS(X;C;R0)  AE(C;R0),
because SR0  ER0. Hence, the candidate equilibrium strategy satises the proposition's stated requirements.
It forms a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium if no rm can gain by a one-shot deviation from it
(e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Theorem 4.2). The value to an active rm if all rms follow the strategy
is v(X;C;R0) = wR0(X;C). By construction, the strategy dictates an optimal action for entrants and for
active rms contemplating the period's nal survival decision (i.e. X = 0). To show that the strategy also
dictates an optimal action for an active rm facing X  1 active rms with higher names, note that survival
is optimal if C 2 SR0 because either C 62 SR0+1, so that wR0(X;C) = wR0(0;C) > 0, or C 2 SR0+1, so that
wR0(X;C)  wR0+1(X 1;C) > 0. If instead C 62 SR0, then exit is optimal because wR0(X;C)  wR0(0;C) 
0. Therefore, no rm can prot from a one-shot deviation and the strategy forms an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. The LIFO strategy constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 defaults to inactivity.
Thus, a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in a LIFO strategy that defaults to inactivity exists.
Uniqueness can be proven recursively, following the recursive construction of a candidate equilibrium
strategy in the proof of Proposition 1.
(i). In any equilibrium in a LIFO strategy that defaults to inactivity, the expected discounted prots
v(X;C;R0) equal 0 and the entry and survival sets equal ER0 = SR0 = ; in all states (X;C;R0) such
that R0 >  N.
(ii). Consequently, in any such equilibrium, N0
 N(X;C) gives the number of rms in the next period in
all states (X;C;  N). Therefore, the expected discounted prots v(X;C;  N) equal the unique solution
w  N(X;C) to Proposition 1's decision problem of a rm with rank  N in all states (X;C;  N). The
equilibrium entry set equals this decision problem's entry set E  N, and the equilibrium survival set
equals its survival set S  N.
20(iii). Next, iterate the following argument for R0 =  N  1;:::;1. Suppose that, in any equilibrium in a LIFO
strategy that defaults to inactivity, the expected continuation value v(X;C; ~ R) equals w ~ R(X;C), the
entry set equals E ~ R, and the survival set equals S ~ R in all states (X;C; ~ R) such that ~ R > R0. Then,
N0
R0(X;C) dened by equation (3) gives the number of rms in the next period in state (X;C;R0).
Hence, in all such equilibria, the expected continuation value v(X;C;R0) equals the solution wR0(X;C)
to Proposition 1's decision problem of a rm with rank R0 in all states (X;C;R0). The equilibrium
entry set equals this decision problem's entry set ER0, and the equilibrium survival set equals its survival
set SR0.
(iv). Recall from Proposition 1's proof that the equilibrium survival rule AS(X;C;R0) is constant in X and
weakly decreases with R0; and the equilibrium entry rule AE(C;R0) weakly decreases with R0.
B Proofs of Results in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy of Proposition 2's equilibrium can be written as AS(N   R;C;R0) =
IfC 2 SR0g and AE(C;R0) = IfC 2 ER0g, where the sets SR0 and ER0 are those dened in the proof
of Proposition 1. From that proof, we know that E1    E  N, S1    S  N, and SR0  ER0 for
R0 = 1; ;  N.
Threshold rules imply monotonicity Suppose that rms of all ranks follow threshold strategies, and
denote the entry and exit thresholds with C1;C2;:::;C  N and C1;C2;:::;C  N. From the above properties of
the equilibrium strategy, we know that C1    C  N, C1    C  N, and CR0  CR0 for R0 = 1; ;  N.











j > Nt;C > Cj
	
; (4)
In this, we set Ci =  C for i >  N. This is obviously increasing in Ct, so the proposition is true for the case
with i = 1. To show that this is true for higher i, proceed inductively. Suppose that Ct weakly increases
Nt+i 1. Inspection of (4) shows that increasing Nt+i 1 weakly increases Nt+i, so increasing Ct weakly
increases Nt+i.
Monotonicity implies threshold rules Suppose that all rms' entry and exit rules are such that in-
creasing Ct weakly increases Nt+i for positive i and any possible initial condition (Nt;Ct) and sequence of
subsequent demand realizations Ct+1;:::;Ct+i 1. To show that this implies that all rms' entry and exit
decisions follow threshold policies, suppose to the contrary that the survival decision of a rm with some
rank R0 does not. That is, there exist two values of Ct, CL < CH such that CL 2 SR0 and CH 62 SR0.
Suppose that Nt = R0 and increase Ct from CL to CH. Then, this change decreases Nt+1 by at least one
rm (the decrease is two or more if CL 2 ER0+1 or CH 62 SR0 1). This contradicts the original supposition,
so all rms' survival decisions must follow threshold rules.
Next, suppose that the entry of a rm with potential rank R0 does not follow a threshold rule. Again
there must exist CL < CH such that CL 2 ER0 and CH 62 ER0. Suppose that Nt = R0   1. Because
SR0 1  SR0  ER0, all R0   1 incumbent rms continue if Ct = CL. Thus, increasing Ct from CL to CH
reduces Nt+1 by at least one rm (the decrease is two or more if CL 2 ER0+1 or CH 62 SR0 1), which again
contradicts the original supposition. Hence threshold policies govern the survival and entry decisions of rms
of all ranks.
The proof of Proposition 4 relies on Proposition 5, so we rst present a proof of the latter.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof has two parts.
21The proposition's mixture representation implies Assumptions 1{3
(i). Assumption 1 is satised, because K





k (C) by the bounded convergence theorem (Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 16.5); and
the set of nondecreasing functions is closed.
(ii). Dene e QK
k (ujC)  QK
k (u+K
k (C)jC) and denote the distribution of U0 given C with e Q(ujC)  Q(u+
(C)jC). The functions e QK
k (jC); k = 1;:::;K; K 2 N; do not depend on C; and the presumption that





Therefore, Assumption 2 is satised.
(iii). Dene b QK
k (ujC)  QK
k (u + (C)jC). From the proposition's nal condition,
K
k (C)   K
k =2   (C)  C   (C):
Consequently, b QK
k (jC) is a uniform distribution with support

K
k (C)   K
k =2   (C);K
k (C) + K
k =2   (C)

that includes or lies below C  (C). Now, the presumption that Q(jC) has the proposition's mixture
representation requires that







By a result of A.I. Khintchine (Feller, 1971, p. 158), this implies that e Q(jC) is concave on [C (C);1).
We have already shown that Assumption 2 holds good, so that e Q(jC) equals e Q(), and is concave above
C   (C) for all C. Because (C) = E[C0jC], this implies Assumption 3.
Assumptions 1{3 imply the proposition's mixture representation The construction proceeds in
two steps:
(i). We write the distribution e Q corresponding to Q(jC) as a mixture of uniform distributions that are
independent of C, distinguishing between its unrestricted part on ( 1;U) and its concave part on
[U;1).
(ii). Subsequently, we write Q(jC) as this same mixture, with E[C0jC] added to the mean of each uniform
distribution, and verify that the construction satises the requirements of the proposition.
Let G; denote a uniform cumulative distribution function on [ =2;+=2]. In particular, G;0 denotes
a distribution that is degenerate at .
(i). Consider the construction of e Q as a mixture of uniform distributions.
(a) First, consider the restriction of e Q to ( 1;U). Fix an arbitrary  > 0. By the Jordan decompo-
sition theorem (Feller, 1971, p. 138), e Q can be written as a mixture of a discrete and a continuous
distribution function. Both the discrete and the continuous part are nondecreasing and bounded
on ( 1;U). This ensures that there exist
{ a nite (and possibly defective) mixture of degenerate distributions with supports in ( 1;U)
that is within a =2 uniform distance from the discrete part; and
{ a piecewise-linear (and possibly defective) cumulative distribution function with support on
a closed subset of ( 1;U) that uniformly approximates the continuous part up to a =2
distance.
22Because the latter can be written as a nite mixture of uniform distributions with supports in
( 1;U), it follows from the triangle inequality that e Q on ( 1;U) can be approximated up
to a  uniform distance by a nite mixture of, possibly degenerate, uniform distributions G;.
Because  > 0 was arbitrary, this implies that there exist pK
k  0, K
k  0, and K
k < U   K
k =2;
k = 1;:::;K=2; such that
PK=2
k=1 pK
k = e Q(U














  = 0; (5)
for even K 2 N.
(b) Because e Q is concave on [U;1) (Assumption 3), by a result of A.I. Khintchine (Feller, 1971,
p. 158), there exist pK
k  0, K
k  0, and K
k  U + K
k =2; k = K=2 + 1;:::;K; such that
PK
k=K=2+1 pK

















 = 0; (6)
for even K 2 N.














  = 0; (7)
for even K 2 N. Dene K
k (C)  K
k + E[C0jC] and QK
k (jC)  GK
k (C);K













  = 0;
for even K 2 N. Moreover, each K
k (C) is weakly increasing with C and QK
k (jC) is a uniform
distribution with the lower end of its support equal to
K
k + E[C0jC]   K
k =2 < U + E[C0jC]   K
k =2  C   K
k =2  C
if k  K=2, and equal to U + E[C0jC]  C if k > K=2.
Proposition 5 allows us to replace Assumptions 1{3 with the representation of Q(jC) as a mixture of
uniform autoregressions. Before we present a proof of Proposition 4 that exploits this result, we rst develop
three auxiliary results.
Denition 4. A function f : [ ^ C;  C] ! R is ~ C-separable for some ~ C 2 [ ^ C;  C], if (i) f(C)  f( ~ C) for all
C > ~ C and (ii) f(C)  f( ~ C) for all C < ~ C.
Lemma 1. Let f : [ ^ C;  C] ! R be integrable with respect to a uniform measure over its domain, ~ C-separable,
and nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C], for some ~ C 2 [ ^ C;  C]. Given a conditional probability distribution Q(jC) for
C0 with nondecreasing expectation (C) that satises either
(i). Q(jC) is degenerate at (C)  C for all C 2 [ ^ C;  C], or
(ii). Q(jC) is uniform on [(C)   
2;(C) + 
2]  [ ^ C;  C] with  > 0 and (C)   
2  C for all C 2 [ ^ C;  C];
then g(C) 
R  C
^ C f(c)dQ(cjC) is nondecreasing in C on [ ^ C; ~ C].
23Proof. In Case (i) , the result follows immediately from g(C) = f((C)). Now consider Case (ii). First, note
that g(C) =  1 R (C)+=2
(C) =2 f(c)dc. Because f is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C], it immediately follows that g is




























Here, the rst inequality uses that the rst integral is over an interval to the right of ~ C and that f is ~ C-
separable. The second inequality uses that the second integral is over an interval to the left of ~ C and that
f is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C]. Taken together, this implies that g is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C].









K(jC) that each individually satisfy the conditions of Lemma
1, then gK(C) 
R  C
^ C f(c)dQK(cjC) is nondecreasing in C on [ ^ C; ~ C].
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that gk(C) 
R  C
^ C f(c)dQk(cjC) is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C], k = 1;:::;K. In turn,
because gK(C) =
PK
k=1 pkgk(C), this implies that gK(C) is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C].
Lemma 3. Let f : [ ^ C;  C] ! R be bounded, ~ C-separable, and nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C], for some ~ C 2 ( ^ C;  C].
Let Q1;Q2;::: be a sequence of mixture Markov transition functions satisfying the conditions of Lemma
2 such that supjQK   Qj ! 0 for some Markov transition distribution function Q as K ! 1. Then,
g(C) 
R  C
^ C f(c)dQ(cjC) is nondecreasing in C on [ ^ C; ~ C].
Proof. Lemma 2 implies that the function gK corresponding to each QK; K = 1;2;:::; is nondecreasing
on [ ^ C; ~ C]. By the bounded convergence theorem (Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 16.5), gK ! g as K ! 1.
Because the set of nondecreasing functions is closed, g is nondecreasing on [ ^ C; ~ C].
We are now prepared to present the proof of Proposition 4, using Proposition 5's mixture representation
of Q(jC).
Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 2, the unique equilibrium strategy is characterized by the survival
sets SR0  fCjwR0(0;C) > 0g and the entry sets ER0  fCjwR0(0;C) > '(R0)g, with wR0 the unique xed
point of the Bellman operator TR0 dened by Equation (2); for R0 = 1;:::;  N. We need to show that there
exist thresholds CR0 and CR0 such that SR0 = fC C > CR0g and ER0 = fC C > CR0g; R0 = 1;:::;  N.
Characterization of S  N and E  N Assumptions 1, 2, and 4; and the bounded convergence theorem
(Billingsley, 1995, Theorem 16.5); imply that the operator T  N maps the complete subspace of functions
in W that are nondecreasing and continuous from the left in C into itself. Consequently, the value func-
tion w  N(X;C) is nondecreasing and continuous from the left in C. It immediately follows that there exist
thresholds C  N and C  N such that S  N = fC C > C  Ng and E  N = fC C > C  Ng. Note that either of these
thresholds might equal ^ C  or  C, where ^ C  is an arbitrary number strictly below ^ C representing the rule to
be active in all demand states (including ^ C).
24Characterization of SR0 and ER0 for R0 =  N   1;:::;1 This proceeds iteratively. Suppose that; for
~ R = R0+1;:::;  N; there exist thresholds C ~ R and C ~ R such that S ~ R = fC C > C ~ Rg and E ~ R = fC C > C ~ Rg.
Moreover, suppose that wR0+1(0;C) is nondecreasing in C for all C  CR0+1 and that wR0+1(X;C) is
continuous from the left in C. We will show that then there exist thresholds CR0 and CR0 such that
SR0 = fC C > CR0g, ER0 = fC C > CR0g, wR0(0;C) is nondecreasing in C for all C  CR0, and wR0(X;C)
is continuous from the left in C. There are two cases to consider.
(i). In the rst, ER0+1 = ;, so that a rm entering with rank R0 expects no further entry to occur during its
lifetime. This case is identical to the case where R0 =  N, so there exist thresholds CR0 and CR0 such
that SR0 = fC C > CR0g and ER0 = fC C > CR0g, wR0(0;C) is nondecreasing in C, and wR0(X;C)
is continuous from the left in C.
(ii). In the second case, ER0+1 6= ;. The supposition that all rms with ranks R0 + 1 and up use threshold
rules ensures that N0
R0(X;C) is continuous from the left in C. With Assumption 4 and the bounded
convergence theorem, this implies that the operator TR0 maps the complete subspace of functions in
W that are continuous from the left in C into itself. Consequently, wR0(X;C) is continuous from the
left in C.
To prove the remaining results, we consider two subcases.
(a) In the rst, wR0(0;C) > '(R0) for all C, so we can set CR0 = CR0 = ^ C , for any ^ C  < ^ C.
Trivially, wR0(0;C) is nondecreasing in C for all C  CR0.
(b) In the second subcase, wR0(0;C)  '(R0) for some C. The argument for this subcase requires
the construction of an auxiliary sequence of value functions by iterating on the Bellman operator
TR0. To this end, initialize w1




R0 ). This sequence converges to the unique xed point wR0 of TR0. We rst show
that, for all i  1, w
i+1
R0  wi
R0 and wi(X;C) is continuous from the left in C.
{ From the proof of Proposition 1, recall the denition of WR0, the space of all functions
w(X;C) 2 W that are weakly decreasing in X for all C and satisfy w(X+1;C)  wR0+1(X;C),
X = 0;:::;  N   2. In that proof, we showed that TR0 maps WR0 into itself. Note that
w1
R0(X;C) is weakly decreasing in X and w1




R0) 2 WR0. Consequently,
{ w2
R0(X;C)  wR0+1(X   1;C) = w1
R0(X;C) for all X  1, and
{ w2
R0(0;C)  w2










{ By supposition, w1
R0(X;C) is continuous from the left in C. Because TR0 maps the space
of functions that are continuous from the left in C into itself, this property carries over to
wi
R0(X;C) for all i.
We next show with induction that wi
R0 (0;C) and C
i
R0  inffCjwi
R0(0;C) > '(R0)g  C
i 1
R0
together satisfy the conditions for f(C) and ~ C in Lemma 3, and that wi
R0(0;C) > '(R0) for
all C 2 (C
i
R0;  C]. By supposition, w1
R0(0;C) = wR0+1(0;C) and CR0+1 together satisfy the
conditions for f(C) and ~ C in Lemma 3, and w1
R0(0;C) > '(R0 + 1) for C 2 (CR0+1;  C]. Since
wR0+1(0;C) is continuous from the left, w1
R0(0;CR0+1)  '(R0 + 1). Because '(R0 + 1)  '(R0),
and w1
R0(0;C) is nondecreasing and continuous from the left for C 2 [ ^ C;CR0+1], the conditions for
Lemma 3 continue to hold good after replacing CR0+1 with C
1
R0  CR0+1. Moreover, w1
R0(0;C) >
'(R0 + 1)  '(R0) for C 2 (CR0+1;  C]. To show that w1
R0(0;C) > '(R0) for C 2 (C
1
R0;CR0+1] as
well, note that w1
R0(0;C) is nondecreasing on this interval and that, for any  > 0, there exists a




R0 +) such that w1
R0(0;Cy) > '(R0). Consequently, w1




Continuing, suppose that w
i 1
R0 (0;C) and C
i 1
R0 satisfy Lemma 3's requirements for f(C) and ~ C,
and that w
i 1
R0 (0;C) > '(R0) for all C 2 (C
i 1
R0 ;  C]. Lemma 3 then implies that E[w
i 1
R0 (0;C0)jC]
25is nondecreasing in C on [ ^ C;C
i 1
R0 ]. This and inspection of Equation (2) determine that wi
R0(0;C)
is nondecreasing in C on the same interval. Because wi
R0(0;C)  w
i 1





R0 and that wi
R0(0;C) > '(R0) for C 2 (C
i 1
R0 ;  C]. To show that wi





R0 ] as well, note that wi
R0(0;C) is nondecreasing on this interval and that, for any




R0 + ) such that wi
R0(0;Cy) > '(R0). Consequently,




3's requirements of f(C) and ~ C and wi
R0(0;C) > '(R0) for all C 2 (C
i
R0;  C]. Here, we use that
wi




Dene CR0 = limi!1 C
i
R0. We wish to show that
{ wR0(0;C)  '(R0) and is nondecreasing in C for all C 2 [ ^ C;CR0] and
{ wR0(0;C) > '(R0) for all C 2 (CR0;  C].
The rst assertion holds trivially if CR0 = ^ C, so focus on the case where CR0 > ^ C. Note
that wi
R0(0;C) is nondecreasing in C and weakly less than '(R0) on [ ^ C;C
i
R0] for all i. Because
CR0  C
i













For the second assertion's demonstration, recall that wi
R0(0;C) > '(R0) for all C 2 (CR0;  C]. The
denition of CR0 implies that we can nd an i for any given C > CR0 such that wi
R0(0;C) > '(R0).
Since the sequence fwi
R0(0;C)g is nondecreasing, its limit wR0(0;C) must also exceed '(R0).
With this established, clearly ER0 = fCjC > CR0g. Dene
CR0  supfCjwR0(0;C)  0g
if fCjwR0(0;C)  0g 6= ;, and CR0  ^ C  otherwise. By construction, CR0  CR0. Because
wR0(0;C) is nondecreasing and continuous from the left for C 2 [ ^ C;CR0], we can write SR0 =
fCjC > CR0g.
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